

CHAPTER 10 RADIATION SAFETY INTERLOCK SYSTEMS

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PART 1 REQUIREMENTS

1001 Purpose, Scope, and Definitions

1. The purpose of a radiation safety interlock system is to prevent injury, death, or serious overexposure from high radiation levels. The subject matter of this chapter does not apply to electrical safety interlocks.
2. For the purposes of this chapter personnel radiation safety interlocks include: radiation enclosure interlocks, radiation activated interlocks, and some beam controlling devices such as magnet current comparators, collimators, etc.
3. The provisions of this chapter apply to all Divisions and Sections having responsibility for providing radiation interlock systems to prevent personnel exposure to high radiation levels.
4. The following definitions are pertinent to the application of the requirements of this chapter:
 - a. **Beam Enclosure.** Any area containing beamlines and surrounded by walls or fences with all access points interlocked to turn off the beam. Included are areas which do not contain beamlines but which represent potential radiation hazards equivalent to those of beam enclosures.
 - b. **Critical Devices.** Any power supply, beam stop, collimator, or device which prohibits the entry of a particle beam or otherwise prohibits the generation of ionizing radiation.
5. The following reference materials may be used as guidance for designing radiation safety interlock systems:
 - a. Radiation Alarm and Access Control Systems, NCRP Report 88, National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement, Washington, DC (1986).
 - b. Health Physics Manual of Good Practices for Accelerator Facilities, US DOE Report SLAC-327, April 1988.
 - c. "Application of Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries", ANSI/ISA – 84.01 – 1996.

1002 Responsibilities for Radiation Safety Interlock Systems

1. SRSO Responsibilities: The SRSO is ultimately responsible for, but may designate to other individuals in the ES&H Section, to do the following:
 - a. Consult with and advise division/section heads on matters involving personnel radiation safety interlocks in their respective areas.
 - b. Review the designs of new accelerators, new experiments, new critical devices or modifications to existing systems for compliance with the requirements found in this chapter. Review the effect of each modification on the existing system. R.P. Form 19 is to be used for this purpose.
 - c. Audit search-and-secure procedures, interlock key accountability, interlock repair and maintenance procedures, periodic testing, and interlock documentation.

2. Division/Section Head Responsibilities: The division/section heads are responsible for all radiation safety interlock systems under their jurisdiction. They need prior approval from the SRSO for any changes in the interlock system that reduces the level of safety. Furthermore, the division/section heads are responsible for providing the SRSO with the following information on a timely basis:
 - a. Notification of instances of interlock jumpering¹ with the exception of the following:
 - tests and repairs performed with the beam-off
 - by-passing of individual radiation monitors at the Area RSOs discretion
 - b. Notification of instances of failures of interlock system or components that would have compromised the level of safety of the system.
 - c. Notification of completion of interlock tests and problems found which may have compromised the system. (Worksheets must be made available upon request.)
 - d. Drawings of new interlock systems submitted for review. Review and approval by the SRSO of all new installations are required prior to their initial use. Prudence suggests that the necessary drawings² and functional descriptions be provided sufficiently early so that this review is completed prior to the construction and installation of the equipment. RP Form # 42

¹ If the jumpered interlock will affect the level of safety in a primary or high intensity secondary beam area, prior approval is required from the ES&H Section Head.

² If the work is just an extension of an older system or a minor modification, then reference to existing drawings or a memo stating the exact nature of the work will be acceptable. Once drawings are available copies may be requested by the ES&H Section.

is to be used for this purpose. Failure to do so may result in delay of the interlock approval and thus in delay of operation of that beamline.

- e. Submission of drawings and functional descriptions of all modifications² made to existing systems for review. (SRSO approval is required prior to use of modified systems.)
- f. Other relevant information such as significant changes to policy or procedures that effect personnel safety as determined by the division/section head.
- g. Any changes to, or installation of radiation safety interlock systems requires the approval of the appropriate division/section RSO.

1003 Hardware Requirements for Interlocks

1. General Requirements: Devices for all interlocked areas should have a built-in redundancy either in hardware or methods. Their design should be as foolproof (immune against human error and tampering) and fail-safe (failure leading to a safe status) as reasonably achievable. Systems which employ computer-based monitoring or subsystems shall have a demonstrated immunity to external tampering (hacking).

Where at all possible, reliance should be placed on passive items wall barriers, locks and shielding rather than on radiation detection devices or electrical surveillance systems. Carefully thought out written procedures and “human engineered” hardware are essential.

2. Material Quality Requirements: Because of the potentially serious consequences of an interlock failure, the highest quality materials and workmanship shall be utilized in the design and installation of the interlock systems. All devices and activation mechanisms should be as failure proof and tamper proof as possible.
3. Fail-Safe and Redundant Systems: Fail-Safe designs shall be used whenever possible. Redundancy of devices or methods is required for all interlocked areas.
 - a. A **fail-safe** system is one which continues to protect people in spite of all anticipated mechanisms of single component failure. Thus, loss of power, a cold solder joint, or a malfunctioning circuit element must result in a safe condition (e.g., beam not being permitted).
 - b. A **redundant** system is one which uses independent (but not necessarily identical or parallel) methods of sensing and control to achieve the same goal, i.e., preventing or minimizing the severity of radiation accidents.
 - c. New and existing systems must conform to the requirements of this section. Exemption from any requirements will be granted by the SRSO

on a case-by-case basis, the criterion being the incremental safety gained compared with the costs of modification.

4. Requirements

- a. Solid state devices can fail in either the “safe” or “unsafe” mode. When using these devices in an interlock system which must be fail-safe and redundant, parity checking must be done at appropriate places between the loops to detect the loss of redundancy caused by an “unsafe” failure of one loop. If there is a discrepancy (each loop shows a different state) then the critical device must be latched off until the parity fault can be investigated. The use of computers in safety systems must conform to the Fermilab Policy on Computing which invokes the reference cited in Article 1001.5.c of this chapter as part of its requirements.
- b. All safety system components shall be labeled and must be secured or supervised to prevent unauthorized access. Systems shall be designed to discourage or prevent the use of the safety system to control critical devices for equipment protection purposes.
- c. There must be two independent loops or methods monitoring each personnel access point and each key in a key tree that prohibit beam whenever a personnel access point is opened or key removed. Each key which allows access must be kept in a key tree. Key trees in unsupervised areas must be locked. (See Article 1004 for exceptions.) Signals from both interlock loops shall be sent to the critical device(s).
- d. There must be two independent switches or redundant methods (for example, one pulsed optical sensor set or one mechanical and one magnetic switch) on each door, or personnel access for all new systems (after 1991). These shall be placed on the side of the door opposite from the hinges except in the instance of pulsed optical sensors. The switches must be inside the enclosure. In addition, the door must be locked, except in areas where gates and doors are used to separate interlocked beam enclosures and locking them would constitute a life safety code violation
- e. Enclosure interlock status indicators are required at each entrance. It is recommended that critical devices status indicators also be used at each entrance.
- f. There shall be hardware to require a full search-and-secure at startup and after each gate/door interlock trip. The reset stations shall be connected in a sequence which ensures a systematic and thorough search.
- g. An announcement or an audible warning must sound in the enclosures after the completion of the search-and-secure for a period of time

sufficient to allow safe egress or interlock disablement, but for 30 seconds at a minimum.

5. Additional Hardware Requirements/Recommendations for X-Ray Radiation Generating Devices in Interlocked Controlled Access Areas: A graded approach will be used to determine the levels of redundancy and control for areas where x-ray radiation is produced.

Devices generating up to 100 mrem/hour measured at one foot.

- a. No interlock hardware controls to inhibit x-rays are required.

Devices generating over 100 mrem/hour up to 1000 mrem/hour measured at one foot.

- a. One method of turning off the generating device is required.

Devices generating over 1000 mrem/hour measured at one foot.

- a. Two independent methods of turning off the generating device are required.
- b. Opening the access door must shut off the generating devices independent of the action of the key tree.

6. Additional Hardware Requirements/Recommendations for Beam-Off Interlocked Controlled Access Areas

- a. One critical device protecting a given area is required, but two are recommended. If only one is used, a failure mode critical device is required.
- b. In those areas where a single critical device is used to ensure safety, status monitoring is required to detect a device failure and inhibit a failure mode device. Where two or more critical devices are used, status monitoring is recommended. In addition, in order to preserve redundancy and independent control, the control permit to the failure mode critical device must be different from the control signal to the primary critical device(s). Lastly, the failure mode critical device must be different from the primary critical device or inhibit the primary critical device in a completely different manner.
- c. Opening the access door must shut off the critical device independent of the action of the key tree.

7. Additional Hardware Requirements/Recommendations for Beam-On Interlocked Controlled Access Areas

- a. “Squawks” or similar devices which operate independently from the interlock system are recommended to indicate the presence of beam.
- b. There must be an indication of beamline critical device status at each access point.
- c. Where appropriate, there shall be two redundant methods to prevent or detect beam going down the wrong beam channel(s).
- d. There must be a mechanism to lock-out the beamline critical device for experimental areas where beam-on access is possible so that personnel may safely work in the path of the beam. There shall be hardware to prevent re-enabling of the locked-out device by personnel other than the initiating person.
- e. There shall be a system to remove beam from a beam-on access area whenever a controlled access door is left open for a period greater than approximately 45 seconds. The line may be reset only by authority of the designated division/section personnel.

1004 Required Procedures

Each operating (accelerator/beamline) area shall have written procedures for the categories given below. Since the areas are unique, procedures should be tailored to meet operating needs and avoid hazards. All procedures must be approved by the appropriate division/section heads or their designee.

1. Interlock Key Accountability

- a. Radiation safety interlock keys must be inventoried at least annually.
- b. Lock systems compromised by the loss of any key which operates them must be replaced.
- c. Extra keys³ must never be used to replace lost or missing keys. If any extra keys are to be maintained, then the division/section head must establish, approve, and maintain a system of controls which includes written directions for conditions under which the keys may or may not be used, how and where they are to be stored, and a list of personnel authorized to use them. Extra keys must be inventoried in conjunction with safety system tests for the appropriate areas.

³ Extra keys are those not interlocked. This includes control and master keys. It does not include extra key-core sets.

- d. The head of the division or section responsible for the interlock system is responsible for assuring that interlock keys are procured only by personnel designated in writing.
2. Search-and-Secure Procedures
 - a. The purpose of search-and-secure is to ensure that exclusion areas have been cleared of all personnel before beam is permitted.
 - b. Each division or section responsible for such exclusion areas shall have an established and auditable program for verifying the adequacy of its search-and-secure procedures. This program shall include hiding of a dummy in any accessible portion of an enclosure (preferably where personnel could have been working) on an average of at least once every four operating weeks. A reduced frequency for hiding is appropriate for areas searched-and-secured much less frequently (e.g., the Tevatron tunnel). Alternative dummy hiding frequencies shall be proposed by the Division/Section RSO and approved by the SRSO.
3. Controlled Access Procedures
 - a. **Beam-Off Controlled Access:** Beam-off controlled access (beam-off entry without breaking interlocks) is permitted in most areas. Controlled access is accomplished by removing keys from their interlocked positions in a key tree. During the access the interlocks are not broken; therefore, these keys provide assurance that beam cannot be turned on. It is therefore required that every person making an entry have a key in his/her possession at all times. The keys used to open the entry door shall not be left in the “enter” box or door. In general, all personnel entering must have had appropriate training from the RSO and be listed on a controlled access authorization list. Specific exceptions to these training requirements may be permitted for short-term accesses involving for example, visiting dignitaries, provided appropriately trained escorts accompany the visitors and the division/section RSO or designee has granted approval.
 - b. **Beam-On Controlled Access:** Beam-on controlled access is essentially the same as the above. Care must be taken by all entering personnel to keep out of the path of the beam. If work must be done in the path of the beam, the beamline critical device must be locked out—turning off the critical device from the computer console is not sufficient. All personnel entering should be approved by the RSO or designee and must have been trained by the RSO or designee and be listed on a controlled access authorization list.

- c. **Training for Controlled Access:** All unescorted personnel making controlled access shall be trained by the RSO or designee. Specifications for training are given in Chapter 6.
4. Interlock Work Procedures
- a. **Maintenance, Repair and Testing**
 - (1) No beam is permitted during tests and/or maintenance.
 - (2) Any maintenance or repair work may only be made by personnel authorized in writing by the division/section head.
 - (3) All work must be documented in a permanent logbook. The integrity of the interlocks must be verified by appropriate tests prior to their next use to protect personnel.
 - (4) The entire interlock system in each area (including each key in each key tree, each door switch, each critical device and lockout, each radiation activated or current/voltage activated interlock) must be thoroughly tested at intervals not greater than 6 months (plus 1 month grace period) when the system is in use. If a system has not been in use for 6 months or longer, then it must be tested before it is used. All interlock tests must be documented. These test records shall be forwarded to the ES&H Section.
 - b. **Documentation of Systems and their Modifications**

Interlock systems must be documented by a complete set of drawings, a written functional description and a written test procedure, and approved for operation by the ES&H Section Head or his designee prior to use. For major changes, an approval for fabrication should be obtained at an early stage to facilitate efficient operations. When the additions and changes to a system are minor or do not affect the procedures, then reference to existing documentation will be acceptable.

c. **Jumpering**

- (1) By-passing of any interlock component must be approved in advance by either the division/section head or RSO and may require approval of the ES&H Section Head (see 1002.2).
- (2) If the jumpered interlock will affect the level of safety in a primary or high intensity secondary area, prior approval is also required from the ES&H Section Head.
- (3) Once a jumper has been placed and before beam is to be delivered to the area, a test must be performed to make certain that only the desired component was jumpered.
- (4) When a jumper is removed, the system must be tested to verify proper functioning of the circuit/component.
- (5) All jumpering, unjumpering and testing of the interlocks must be documented in a permanent record. All jumpers must be inventoried annually.

5. Equipment Access Hatches

There are numerous equipment access hatches located throughout the various beamlines that typically utilize heavy concrete blocks to provide shielding between beamlines and accessible areas. It is impractical to protect against the removal of these shielding blocks with the normal interlocked switches. However, the removal and restoration of this shielding must be controlled to prevent inadvertent removal or beamline startup before restoration. These installations shall be documented as part of the relevant shielding assessment (see article 812). The following procedures are the minimum required to provide the necessary control.

- a. **Locks:** The equipment access hatches must be secured in a manner such that a lock (and a chain if possible) can be placed in a conspicuous spot (lifting eyes of shielding block, hatch cover, etc.) that would prevent inadvertent removal. The key for this lock shall be part of the interlock chain for the enclosure.
- b. **Signs:** Signs shall be conspicuously posted on the shielding blocks, hatch cover, or lock to indicate whom to contact for lock removal and warn about serious consequences of inadvertent removal.

- c. **Procedures:** Procedures shall be written to specify the control measures allowing unlocking and removal of these shielding blocks and controls taken (such as removal and locking up an interlocked key for the enclosure) to prevent beamline startup before shielding is restored. A highly recommended procedure to monitor shielding removal and restoration is the use of a second lock under the control of the RSO. The key of this lock needs not to be part of the interlock chain.